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Are facts about matter primitive?
Jessica Gelber
In his biological treatises, Aristotle often appeals to some feature of an
organism’s body in order to explain why it has some other attribute. For
example, in Generation of Animals ii.1 Aristotle appeals to variations in
degrees of heat, dryness, and fluidity to explain variations inmodes of repro-
duction – why some animals are livebearers and others are egg-producers.
He says that some animals produce “complete” offspring because they
are hotter (thermotera) and more fluid (hugrotera) (732b31–32), whereas
other animals produce only “incomplete” eggs since they are either colder
(psuchrotera) and more fluid, or hotter but drier (xeˆrotera) (733a4–6). In
such contexts, Aristotle treats those bodily features as the primary explanan-
tia of the relevant explananda.
That Aristotle treats certain bodily features – what I will call “facts
about matter”1 – as explanantia in particular explanatory contexts is rela-
tively uncontroversial. Recently, however, scholars have been claiming not
only that Aristotle uses such facts about matter as explanantia in partic-
ular explanatory contexts, but also that Aristotle considers those facts to
be unexplained.2 A kind’s possession of a certain bodily constitution, for
1 I have some reservations about calling these facts about matter, since I do not think that all of
Aristotle’s references to elemental forces such as heat and cold are references to the matter of a living
organism, if this is understood as that “out of which” its body parts are formed (as, e.g., Ebrey
understands it in this volume). I will overlook this for the purposes of this discussion, however.
Following those scholars whose claims I am disputing, I will call such features as heat and cold
“material” features.
2 For instance, D. Charles claims that Aristotle “takes as basic” (2000: 334) and treats as “brute physical
facts” (ibid.: 335) the differences in degrees of heat and fluidity in fish. According to J. Lennox, there
are “certain material facts about certain kinds of animals that are as explanatorily primitive as are
other facts about their living functions” (2001c: 183), and that, in particular, “the amount and kind
of elementally distinct materials available in the nutritional make-up of animals is taken as a given”
(ibid.: 186). A. Gotthelf claims that the fact that lunged organisms have a high degree of heat is, for
Aristotle, “explanatorily fundamental” and not “explained in terms of anything more basic about
these animals” (1985: 54, n. 24). In the same vein, D. Henry (2008: 59) and M. Leunissen (2010:
97) speak of an organism’s material nature making contributions “independently” of the actions of
its formal nature. I gather that their thought is that the material nature of a kind not only makes
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instance, is said to be “explanatorily primitive” in that (1) the bodily consti-
tution is appealed to in explaining other features of the kind and (2) there
is no explanation for why the kind has that particular bodily constitution.3
Not every attribute that functions as a starting point in some particular
explanatory context is an unexplained or primitive one, of course. For
example, we might appeal to the nature of iron to explain why axe blades
rust. But that does not entail that it is a primitive fact – one that is
not itself explained – that axe blades are made of iron. So, the fact that
Aristotle appeals to bodily features (such as temperature or humidity) to
explain why a kind of organism has some other attribute (such as its mode
of reproduction) does not alone entail that he considers the possession of
those bodily features to be primitive. Yet, if Aristotle thinks there is an
explanation for the presence of those bodily features, one would hope that
he would indicate what that is. And in these specific cases, he does not.
Given Aristotle’s silence, it is reasonable to conclude that these facts are
indeed primitive.
It would be problematic, however, if this were Aristotle’s view. First,
the idea that facts about matter are “as explanatorily primitive” as facts
about soul would constitute a radical departure from views that Aristotle
expresses elsewhere. There is some consensus, at any rate, that Aristotle
considers explanatory primitiveness – that is, something’s explaining other
facts but not itself being explained by anything else – to be a guide to
essence.4 However, if an organism’s matter were part of its essence, this
would be in tension with Aristotle’s claim in de Anima that soul, not body,
is an organism’s essence.5
Second, the idea that facts about a kind’s matter or bodily features are
“on the same level”6 as facts about its form or soul conflicts with the
positive contributions, but that these contributions are completely “independent” of form in the
sense that the presence of the matter is not explained or caused by form. If the form explained
why that matter is present, matter would not be contributing independently, but rather would be
dependent on form.
3 See D. Henry (2013: esp. 238–39 and n. 25) for a clear statement of this view.
4 The connection between explanatory primitiveness and essence is, for example, the subject of the
investigation in Charles (2000). As Gotthelf puts the idea, unexplained features are “prime candidates
for being part of the essence of the animal in question” (1985: 29). This same assumption is implicit
in phrases such as “explanatorily fundamental and thus parts of the ousia” (ibid.: 53, n. 20) and
“explanatorily basic and thus essential” (Gotthelf 1997 [2012]: 86). See also Lennox (2001c: 202): “If
Aristotle is inclined to decide what is in the account of a thing’s being on the basis of explanatory
primitiveness, and if he is willing, in natural science, to include matter in definitions, then we could
expect that being blooded or being bloodless would indeed be in the substantial being of animals
identified at a sufficiently general level.”
5 DA ii.1, 412b11–13; DA ii.4, 415b8–12.
6 Charles (2000: 340): “Degrees of heat are taken as explanatory givens on the same level as soul
functions, pattern of movement, or being a land animal.”
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programmatic remarks Aristotle makes within his biological treatises. On
the basis of the introductory book of Parts of Animals, for example, it is
natural to suppose that facts about a kind’s matter are going to be explained
by facts about the kind’s soul:
Since every instrument is for the sake of something, and each of the parts
of the body is for the sake of something, and that for whose sake they are
is some activity, it is clear that the composite body, too, is constituted for
the sake of some complex activity. For, sawing has not come to be for the
sake of the saw, but the saw for the sake of sawing; for sawing is a certain
use. So, also, the body is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts for
the sake of the functions for which each has naturally developed. (PA 1.5,
645b14–20)7
Rather than indicating that facts about a kind’s body ormatter are primitive,
Aristotle appears to say that facts about a kind’s body depend on facts about
the kind’s soul: The body as a whole, as well as each of the parts of the
body, naturally develop for the sake of the psychic functions they are
used to perform. So, one expects that in the biological explanations that
follow, facts about the form or soul – an organism’s psychic capacities and
functions – will have explanatory priority over facts about its body. But
according to several scholars, this is not what we find.
In response to this, we might simply give up hope of finding consistency
between Aristotle’s theoretical commitments, as traditionally understood,
and his scientific practices. We might conclude that the results of empirical
research led to the demise of Aristotle’s “brilliant research programme.”8
However, I do not think we need to conclude this. Instead, I here offer three
reasons to doubt that Aristotle treats facts about matter – in particular, facts
about degrees of heat, dryness, fluidity, etc. – as explanatorily primitive.
First, there is evidence that those putative unexplained facts about
degrees of heat, dryness, fluidity, etc. are, in fact, explained. Second, there
are certain cases, such as human intelligence, where Aristotle seems to
think there is a causal explanation proceeding from facts about matter, but
which we have good reason to doubt are intended as proceeding from a
primitive fact. Third, the idea that facts about matter are as explanatorily
primitive as facts about form requires a particular conception of the causal
processes that the explanations mirror. But this conception of the causal
7 Cf. PA 1.1, 642a9–13:
For, just as it is necessary that an axe be hard, since it needs to cleave, and if hard, made of
bronze or iron, so also – since the body is an instrument (for, each of the parts is for the
sake of something, and so likewise the whole) – it must be like this and made out of these
materials, if that [for the sake of which they are] is to be.
8 Charles (2000: 336).
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processes conflicts with the way Aristotle characterizes them. InGeneration
of Animals, for example, heat is not treated as a causal factor that works
“independently” of soul, but is subservient to soul. In my view, these three
considerations provide compelling reason to reject the claim that Aristotle’s
biology treats facts about matter as primitive.
Hot, cold, earthy, and fluid natures
When Aristotle talks about a type of organism’s matter, he is sometimes
talking about its body, in contrast to its soul. Other times, he describes
the parts of which the whole body is composed as the matter. Those body
parts, moreover, are discussed at three levels of generality. There are the
“non-uniform” parts, such as limbs and organs, the “uniform” parts, such
as flesh and bone that the limbs and organs are made out of, and the
elemental potentials that make up the latter. For instance, at the beginning
of GA Aristotle puts the point as follows:
. . . and the matter in animals is the parts, the non-uniform parts [are the
matter] for every whole [animal], the uniform parts [are the matter] for the
non-uniform, and the so-called elements of the bodies [are the matter] for
these. (GA i.1, 715a9–11)9
Not only the body as a whole, but also the non-uniform limbs and organs,
the tissues, bone, and other uniform parts those are made of, and the ele-
mental bodies (or, more precisely, the elemental powers) are considered by
Aristotle to be an organism’s matter. Here I will focus on matter at that
lowest level, the bodily blend or krasis of elemental powers in an organism’s
blood (or the analogous substance in non-blooded organisms). I will focus
onmatter at this level because it is the strongest candidate for being a primi-
tive fact about matter. For, as the lowest level of composition, the elemental
powers are the matter out of which the primary uniform part, blood (or
the analogous substance in bloodless animals), is composed. Since blood
is constituted by a particular combination of elemental powers, differences
in blood are due to differences in the proportions of the elemental powers
composing it, that is, by its krasis. For instance, blood can be more fluid
9 Cf. PA ii.1, 646a12–24 (Lennox trans.):
Since there are three compositions, one might put first composition from what some people
call the elements, e.g., earth, air, water, and fire. And yet, perhaps it is better to speak of
composition from the potentials . . . That is, moist, dry, hot, and cold are the matter of the
composite bodies . . . Second is the composition of the nature of the uniform parts within
the animal – e.g., of bone, flesh, and the other things of this sort – out of the primary things.
Third and last in the series is the composition of the nature of the non-uniform parts – e.g.,
of face, hand, and such parts.
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or more solid, hotter or less hot, depending on its proportion of elemental
powers. Blood, moreover, is the matter and nourishment for the rest of
the parts,10 and thus blood (or the analogous uniform part in bloodless
organisms) is said to be the cause of many other features.
The nature of the blood is the cause of many features of animals with respect
to both character and perception, as is reasonable, since blood is the matter
of the entire body; for nourishment is matter, and blood is the last stage of
nourishment. It therefore makes a great difference whether it is hot or cold,
thin or thick, turbid or pure. (PA ii.4, 651a12–17)
In Aristotle’s view, characteristics such as the “heaviness, lightness, density,
rarity, roughness, and smoothness” of parts and limbs (PA ii.1, 646a18–
20) “follow from” the particular krasis that makes up the blood and so
determines its quality. More earthy blood will give rise to parts that are,
for instance, rougher rather than smooth.11 In addition, krasis of blood
is correlated with character traits (etheˆ). For example, Aristotle says that
timid animals have excessively watery blood, whereas organisms with more
earthy blood are more passionate (PA ii.4, 650b27 ff ). Further, there is
some indication that Aristotle thinks krasis determines what kind of food
an organism eats, or at least what it finds pleasant (HA vii[ viii].2, 589a8–9;
590a10–11).12
A kind’s krasis, then, is identified by Aristotle as a cause of many other
attributes of the kind. Characteristics such as skin texture, aspects of the
kind’s character, and phenomena constitutive of the kind’s life (such as its
mode of reproduction) all appear to be due to the particular krasis of blood
that organisms of that kind have. Is a kind’s possession of a particular krasis
of blood a primitive, unexplained fact about the kind?
If one accepts the following principle, the answer is no:
P: If X is said to be present for the sake of Y, then X’s presence is
explained by Y.
Aristotle’s views about explanation are complex, but I think it is safe to
assume that he thinks that one explains why something is the case by citing
causes. And, famously, Aristotle recognizes “that for the sake of which” as
a type of cause. Given this, it follows that to cite the purpose for which
10 PA ii.3, 650b2–3, b12–13: “It is, then, apparent from these and like considerations that blood is
present in blooded animals for the sake of nourishment . . . blood is for the sake of nourishment,
i.e. the nourishment of the parts.”
11 See PA ii.9, 655a26–28 with iv.13, 697a7–9 on the selachian’s rough skin.
12 See also the various remarks about the connection between krasis and an organism’s way of life in
vii[ viii].2.
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something is the case is, for Aristotle, to render that thing at least partially
explained.13
Assuming that Aristotle is committed to P, then the discussion of the
levels of composition in PA ii.1 is evidence that a kind’s krasis of blood
is not, for Aristotle, explanatorily primitive. For, Aristotle explicitly says
there that a kind’s krasis is for the sake of something.
Thus the matter of the elements is necessary for the sake of the uniform
parts, since these are later in generation than the elements, and later than
the uniform parts are the non-uniform parts. (PA ii.1, 646b5–8 (Lennox
trans.))
Let me state very briefly what I take Aristotle to be saying in the sur-
rounding context. The highest of the three levels of material composition
of living bodies – the instrumental, non-uniform parts such as eyes and
hands – have functions. And it is for the sake of performing those func-
tions that they are present in an organism. For instance, birds have wings
because they are flyers, since wings are the instruments required for flying
(PA iv.12, 693b11–13). And sensory organs are present because they are
required for performing perceptual activities. Flesh, for instance, is the
organ of the primary sense – touch – that animals must have since they
are by definition perceptive living things (PA ii.8, 653b22–24).14
Most variations,15 such as variations in size or quality of the instrumental
parts and sensory organs, are explained by the functional needs of the par-
ticular kind of organism.16 For instance, some birds (such as the carnivores
13 I say “at least partially” because Aristotle says at APo. ii.11, 94a20–27 that one should give demon-
strations “through” each of the four causes to fully explain something. I cannot address here the
complicated issues about Aristotle’s conception of explanation. It is sufficient for my purposes to
note that there is a difference between cases in which there is a demonstration through some cause
or other, and cases in which there simply is no cause to cite and so no demonstration to give, for
example, in the case of indemonstrable statements of essence. There will be material and efficient
causal explanations of how organisms perform the activities constitutive of their essence, of course,
but that does not render the fact that the organisms have those essential activities explained. That
is, there is no explanation of why they have the essential activities and functions that they do.
14 It is uncertain how, exactly, Aristotle is thinking of the role that flesh plays in tactile sensation. See
Lennox (2001a: 213) for a discussion of this. At any rate, it is clear that Aristotle thinks that flesh is
necessary for touch, so this complication does not matter for my purposes here.
15 Two exceptions come to mind: Aristotle says that a certain octopus has a slender body and that the
elephant has a large size, but does not give any explanation for these facts. The slenderness of the
octopus explains its having only a single row of suckers (PA iv.9, 685b12–16), and the elephant’s
large size explains its having a trunk (PA ii.16, 658b33 ff ). It is not clear how Aristotle is conceiving
of size or other “dimensional” features, though there is some reason to be cautious about calling
these features “material” ones. In de Anima ii.4, 416a16–18 Aristotle claims that the “limit and logos
of size and growth” is “of soul” and more “of account” than “of matter.”
16 In other cases, differences are explained by the kind’s krasis. The number of gills that a kind of
fish has, for instance, is due to its degree of heat (since gills are the instruments for cooling in
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with crooked talons) have larger wings with plentiful feathers (PA iv.12,
693b27–694a4) because they need to be good flyers (presumably because
of the way they catch their food, by chasing down rodents and grabbing
them). In order to perform their functions, the instrumental parts must
have certain powers or capabilities. The human hand, for instance, “needs
one power (dunamis) for the action of compressing and another for that
of grasping” (PA ii.1, 646b23–25). In order to have such powers, the hand
must be made of appropriate uniform matter, for example, matter that
has what I will call “dispositional properties” such as hardness, softness,
elasticity, and flexibility.17 Uniform parts, considered as parts with certain
dispositional properties, are the parts thatmeet the functional requirements
of the non-uniform parts they compose.18 This is why the uniform parts
are said to be for the sake of the non-uniform.
Finally, the dispositional properties of uniform parts are brought about
by particular kinds of elemental blends. As we learn in Meteorology iv,
dispositional properties (called patheˆmata in Meteorology) are the results
of the interactions of the active powers – the hot and the cold – and the
passive powers – the moist and the dry. Particular proportions of those
elemental powers give rise to those dispositional properties by which uni-
form substances such as flesh, bone, and wood are distinguished from one
another, such as solubility, solidity, and flexibility. When a particular ele-
mental blend is the right one to bring about the uniform parts (considered
water-dwellers, and so hotter ones need more gills to cool them) (PA iv.13, 696b12–23). But, again,
the fact that krasis explains other features does not entail that the presence of that particular krasis
is a basic, unexplained feature.
17 PA ii.1, 646b10–27:
Now animals are composed out of both of these two sorts of parts, uniform and non-
uniform; the former, however, are for the sake of the latter, as it is to the latter that actions
and operations belong (e.g. eye, nose, the face as a whole, finger, hand, the arm as a whole).
And inasmuch as the actions and movements both of an animal as a whole and of its parts
are complex, the substances out of which these are composed must of necessity possess
distinct dunameis. Softness is useful for some purposes, hardness for others; some parts
must be able to stretch, some to bend. In the uniform parts, then, such dunameis are found
apportioned out separately: one of the parts, for instance, will be soft, another hard, while
one is fluid, another solid; one viscous, another brittle. In the non-uniform parts, on the
other hand, these dunameis are found in combination, not singly. For example, the hand
needs one dunamis for the action of compressing and another for that of grasping. Hence
it is that the instrumental parts of the body are composed of bones, sinews, flesh, and the
rest of them, and not the other way around.
18 Lips and nostrils, for instance, are “fleshy” (sarkina) because the dispositional features of flesh are
required by the functions that lips and nostrils perform in living organisms that have them (see
PA ii.16, 660a8–11). The function of lips in all animals that have them is to protect the teeth.
In humans, in addition to this function, lips also help enable speech (PA ii.16, 659b30–34). The
function of nostrils in organisms that have lungs is to enable breathing (PA ii.16, 659a30–31).
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as parts with certain dispositional features), that blend is required by, and
so present for the sake of, the presence of the uniform parts.
Each level of bodily composition is said to be for the sake of the one
above. The matter for the instrumental parts – the uniform parts – must
have specific dispositional features appropriate to their functions. And the
uniform parts, considered as parts with distinctive dispositional features,
must be composed of specific elemental blends that give rise to those
dispositional features. For this reason, the particular elemental composition
of the blood is for the sake of the parts that come to be formed out it. Thus,
if we accept principle P, Aristotle’s discussion in PA ii.1 gives us grounds
for thinking that a kind’s krasis is not primitive.
In sum, a kind’s particular krasis can give rise to various features (such as
hard eyelids) because of the nature of that elemental blend, and thus krasis
can explain (in a given explanatory context) other features. And certain
features, such as the dispositional properties that the uniform parts need
to have, may come to be formed “of necessity” (as described inMeteorology
iv), because the material at the lowest level of composition naturally has
certain effects. But this does not make it a “brute” or “primitive” fact that
an organismal kind has that particular composition or blend. It might be a
brute or primitive fact that the elements have the causal powers that they
do, but asking why the elements have the causal powers they do is different
than asking why some particular elemental blends are present in a kind of
organism’s blood.19 As I understand it, Aristotle’s view is that the presence
of a particular krasis in an organism’s blood is explained teleologically, by
reference to the dispositional properties that the kind’s uniform parts must
have. Uniform parts must have certain dispositional properties, given the
functions that the non-uniform parts they constitute must perform. If this
is correct, then a kind’s krasis is not a primitive, unexplained fact.
Heat and human intelligence
The argument offered in the last section relied on the claim that krasis
is said to be for the sake of something in PA ii. According to what I
called principle P, this renders the presence of the krasis explained, and not
primitive. But one might deny that Aristotle is really saying that krasis is
for the sake of something in the strong sense that makes P sound like a
19 On this point, see Cooper (1987: 261): “if an animal of a certain kind is to be constituted these certain
amounts of certain elements must be present for use: in effect, for this creature those elements are
hypothetically necessitated. But plainly that presupposes, and does nothing to explain, the natural
powers of the elements concerned.”
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plausible principle. In this section I offer a second reason for rejecting the
idea that the possession of a particular krasis is primitive, which reason does
not rely on the claim that krasis is for the sake of the parts formed out of it.
Suppose that Aristotle thinks that a kind’s krasis explains why the kind
has themode of reproduction that it does, and that there is no further expla-
nation for the kind having that particular krasis. Suppose the possession
of a particular krasis, that is, is explanatorily primitive. Now explanatory
primitiveness in the sense at issue here is not relative to an explanatory
context. So, if the particular krasis an organism has is being treated as a
primitive fact about the kind in the explanation of its mode of reproduc-
tion, then it must also be primitive in any other explanation. Yet, some
of the causal connections that Aristotle cites between a kind’s krasis and
other features are such that it would be surprising if krasis – as opposed to
the feature that the particular krasis is causally connected to – were being
treated as explanatorily primitive. Consider, for example, the connection
between krasis and human rational activity:
. . . in man the brain is more fluid and greater in volume than in any other
animal, and the reason of this, in its turn, is that the heat in the heart is
purest in man. The fineness of the blend (eukrasian) in man is shown by his
possession of intellect: there is no other animal which is so intelligent. (GA
ii.6, 744a26–31 (Peck trans.))
Humans, Aristotle says, have the highest degree of heat of any living
organism. That we have the most heat explains, among other things, why
humans alone have an upright posture.
For heat promotes growth, and a profusion of blood is a sign of heat.
And further, the bodies of those that are hotter are more erect, which is
why mankind is the most erect of the animals. (PA iii.6, 669b3–6 (Lennox
trans.))
Being able to stand upright, moreover, allows humans to engage in rational
activities:
Mankind, however, instead of forelimbs and forefeet has arms and what are
called hands. For it alone of the animals is upright, on account of the fact
that its nature and substantial being are divine; and it is a function of that
which is most divine to reason (noein) and to think (phronein). But this is
not easy when much of the body is pressing down from above, since the
weight makes thought and common sense sluggish. (PA iv.10, 686a25–32
(Lennox trans.))
And engaging in rational activities is what distinguishes humans from other
animals. Being able to do so is part of human nature, and actually doing
so is our natural end or purpose (telos):
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Are facts about matter primitive? 55
Reason (logos) and intellect (nous) are for us the goal of nature. (Pol vii.15,
1334b15)20
It is reasonable to suppose that a kind’s telos, for example that the human
telos is rational activity, is a primitive fact. For, what something is, essentially,
and what it is for the sake of, Aristotle says, are the same.21 And what
something is, essentially, has no further explanation.22 If possessing a high
degree of heat were simply a primitive fact about humans, rather than
something that is conditionally necessary for rational activity, then part
of the essence of human beings (rational activity) and a fact about the
human body’s material composition (high degree of heat) would be two
independent facts. That the two facts are coordinated so well – that is, that
the material composition is conducive to some part of the essence – would
then turn out to be due to chance. But this fortuitous coordination occurs
regularly, and Aristotle denies that regularly occurring, beneficial outcomes
could be merely due to chance.23
Further, it is not solely human rationality that Aristotle correlates with
the krasis of a kind’s blood (or the analogous substance in bloodless organ-
ism). First, differences in krasis are also linked to the intelligence and
perceptive capacities of non-human organisms, such as bees:
Thicker (pachuteron) and hotter blood is more productive of strength, while
thinner (leptoteron) and cooler blood is more perceptive and intelligent
(noeroˆteron).24 And the same difference obtains among the attributes anal-
ogous to blood. This is why both bees and other such animals are wiser
(phronimoˆtera) in their nature than many blooded animals, and why among
blooded animals those having cold and thin blood are wiser than their oppo-
sites. But those with hot, thin, and pure (katharon) blood are best; for such
animals are at once in a good state relative to both courage and wisdom
(phroneˆsin). (PA ii.2, 648a2–11 (Lennox trans., modified))
20 Cf. NE x.8, 1178b21–23: “So, then, the activity of a god, superior as it is in blessedness, will be
theoretical activity; and so, too, the human activity that has the greatest affinity to this one will be
more productive of eudaimonia.”
21 Phys. ii.7, 198a24–27. Cf. GA i.1, 715a8–9: “the logos and that for the sake of which as end are the
same (tauton).”
22 Of course, how a kind achieves its telos will have a material and efficient causal explanation. But
what it is does not.
23 Aristotle argues in Phys. ii.8 against an opponent of natural teleology by arguing that regularly
occurring, beneficial natural phenomena cannot be due to chance, and that consequently they are
finally caused.
24 I am taking references to “thick” and “thin” blood as references to blood that is drier and more
fluid, respectively. In GC ii.2, 329b17–330a10, Aristotle says that thick (pachu) and thin (lepton) are
‘of ’ dry and fluid, respectively. What exactly this amounts to is not important for my purposes. I
am solely interested in the connections drawn there between thickness and dryness, and thinness
and fluidity.
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And heat seems to be correlated with other ways that Aristotle ranks
animals:
The reason why some creatures have this part, and why those having it need
respiration, is that the more honorable animals have a greater proportion of
heat. (de Resp. 477a14–16 (Ross trans.))
In my view, Aristotle is not ordering animals on the scale of honor or value
on the basis of how much heat their bodies happen to have, as a primitive
fact. If this is so, we have good reason to doubt that Aristotle considers a
kind’s krasis to be primitive.
Tools
In this section, I offer a third reason for doubting that Aristotle considers
facts about matter to be primitive. In short, this reason is that in Aristotle’s
biological account of animal generation, the elemental powers such as heat
and cold do not operate independently of, but rather are subordinate to, an
organism’s soul. Given that elemental powers play this subordinate causal
role, I will argue, facts about matter cannot be primitive in Aristotle’s
biological explanations.
Before arguing for this, I should emphasize that the idea that Aristotle
thinks facts about matter are primitive is by no means unmotivated. For
example, Aristotle claims in Physics ii.2 and PA i.1 that it is incumbent on
the natural scientist to understand thematter as well as form, since both the
matter and form are said to be a thing’s nature. A natural scientist, Aristotle
thinks, must understand the material basis for the exercise of the various
vital capacities (with the exception of nous) that make up an organism’s
soul and essence. One cannot make sense of life and living things without
understanding the nature “as matter.” Aristotle also claims that natural
beings are analogous to “the snub” in that they cannot be defined without
reference to thematter, just as snubness cannot be definedwithout reference
to the nose. And there are indications that Aristotle considers some bodily
features to be in the being (ousia) or included in the definition (logos teˆs
ousias) of the kind.25 When we add to all of this Aristotle’s appeals to the
necessary interactions of heat and cold, for instance, in explaining various
features of living organisms, it is not unreasonable to think that Aristotle
is treating facts about matter as explanatorily primitive.
25 Gotthelf (1985) discusses in detail the passages where some bodily feature seems to be treated as
included in the essence or definition. See, however, note 15, above.
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The idea that matter is explanatorily primitive, however, requires a
certain picture of the causal processes that the scientific explanationsmirror.
On the interpretation of material facts as primitive, there are, as it were, two
independent sets of explanations; some explanations proceed from form or
soul, and some proceed from matter. Corresponding to those explanations
that proceed from the form or formal nature there is one causal process, and
corresponding to those explanations that proceed from matter is another.
Proponents of the interpretation of material facts as primitive think that
in addition to the goal-directed causal processes, there is also “a necessity
rooted in the material nature of an animal, which constrains, and perhaps
acts independently of, the actions of its formal nature.”26
There is an alternative picture, however, that more accurately portrays
matter’s role. This alternative can accommodate the fact that the matter of
a living organism is in a sense its nature, insofar as it is a source of change
and rest that belongs to it non-accidentally. And this picture also allows
for certain features of living organisms to be formed “of necessity” because
of the interactions of the material elements. Nevertheless, this alternative
does not construe matter as operating independently of form or soul, or
treat the presence of matter as primitive. This is the picture that emerges
in Generation of Animals.
In GA, Aristotle is explaining how the efficient cause of generation (the
father or the father’s nature or soul) conveys the form (which he has in
actuality) to the matter provided by the mother, and how the embryo is
then formed. To do so, Aristotle must explain the material basis by which
form is conveyed, and then how the embryo’s tissues, bones, limbs, and
organs are constructed. Thatmaterial basis, as it turns out, is what wemight
think of as metabolic processes – heating and cooling – in the spermatic
residues and nutritive (and growth promoting) blood.27
When Aristotle describes this process, he sometimes refers to heat and
cold as the tools of soul. Elsewhere, Aristotle also describes the body as a
tool of soul.28 Insofar as Aristotle is conceiving of soul as a living substance’s
capacities for engaging in vital activities, it is natural to understand such
descriptions as indicating that the body parts are the means or instruments
by which vital activities are performed, much like an artisan’s tools are the
means by which the artisan’s techneˆ is carried out. And for parts that have
functions, the description seems apt. Eyes, for instance, are the tools by
26 Lennox (2001c: 187).
27 See, for example, GA ii.6, 743a36–b5 and GA ii.1, 734b28–735a4, both quoted below.
28 For example, PA i.1, 642a9–13; PA ii.7, 652b7–15; and DA 2.4, 415b18–20: “all natural bodies are
tools of soul, as those of animals, so too, those of plants, as being for the sake of soul.”
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
58 jessica gelber
which an organism engages in seeing; hands are tools by which we grasp
and press things. But heat and cold are less obviously analogous to the
craftsman’s tools than are functional organs and limbs. And Aristotle is
aware of this, which is why he modifies the analogy with craft production
when explaining how nutritive soul uses heat and cold as tools:
. . . as the products of art are made by means of the tools of the artisan, or
to put it more truly by means of their movement, and this is the activity
(energeia) of the art, and the art is the form of what is made in something
else, so is it with the power of nutritive soul. As later on in the case of mature
animals and plants this soul causes growth from the nutriment, using heat
and cold as its tools (for the movement of the soul is in these), and each
thing comes into being in accordance with a certain formula, so also from
the beginning does it form the product of nature. (GA ii.4, 740b25–34 (Platt
trans., modified))
Here Aristotle compares heat and cold not to an artisan’s tools but to their
movements, that is, the tools as they are being used. These movements of
the artisan’s tools, Aristotle says, are the energeia or activity of the artisan’s
techneˆ. This suggests that the important point of the analogy between the
movements of the artisan’s tools and the heating and cooling in blood is
that each is the activity or energeia of some dunamis. In living organisms,
the heating and cooling are the activities of soul capacities; these are how
those vital activities are carried out.
If we grant that Aristotle is thinking of heat and cold in this way –
that is, as tools by which soul capacities are exercised – two points follow.
First, it follows from the idea that heat and cold are tools or instruments
that their causal role is thereby a subsidiary one. They are sunaitia, not
aitia.29 And subsidiary causes never operate independently of the first or
primary cause to which they are subordinate. Consequently, as subsidiary
causes, the elemental powers in living organisms’ bodies do not operate
independently of, but are rather subordinate to form or soul.30
Second, auxiliary causes can have their own per se effects. The drugs that
the doctor prescribes, for instance, have powers “of necessity” to alter the
patient’s body. Those powers the drugs have are not working independently
of the doctor’s art, however; the drugs are present in the patient’s body
(they have been ingested, that is) only because the doctor prescribed them.
Nevertheless, the powers in the drugs cause changes in the patient.
29 Cf. DA ii.4, 416a13–14.
30 Balme (1987: 276) also makes the point that as sunaitia, the matter’s “natural action and movement”
will not produce its effects unless “nature causes it to do so.”
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Similarly, heat and cold in living organisms have powers, grounded in
necessity, of producing features (softness, hardness, etc.) of the body, just
as they do in craft production.
Heat and cold (which is deprivation of heat) are both employed by Nature.
Each has the power, grounded in necessity, of making one thing into this
and another thing into that; but in the case of the forming of the embryo it
is for a purpose that their power of heating and cooling make it such, partly
owing to necessity, partly for a purpose – sinew solid and elastic, bone solid
and brittle. (GA ii.6, 743a36–b5 (Peck trans.))
As tools of soul, and so subsidiary causes, heat and cold can cause changes
in the embryo’s body. But still, just as in the case of craft production, heat
and cold do not operate on their own.
And as in speaking of an axe or any other instrument, we should not say
that it was made solely by fire, so we should not say this about a foot or a
hand, nor, similarly, of flesh either, because there is a function of this also.
As for hardness, softness, toughness, brittleness and the rest of such qualities
which belong to the parts that have soul in them, heat and cold may very
well produce these, but they certainly do not produce the logos in virtue
of which the one is now flesh and the other bone. Rather, the movement
derived from the generator who is in actuality that which the material out
of which the offspring is formed is in potential. The very same thing applies
to things formed in accordance with art. For, heat and cold may soften and
harden the iron, but they do not produce the sword. This is done by the
movement of the tools, which has the logos of the art. For the art is the
principle and form of the thing being made, but in another. But nature’s
movement is in [the product being formed], derived from another natural
being having the form in actuality. (GA ii.1, 734b28–735a4)
Viewed from this perspective, the idea that matter operates independently
of soul does not really get a foothold. Rather, matter is always operating
as a tool of soul, and so subordinate to it. Accordingly, facts about matter
in the scientific demonstrations that display the causes will also be subor-
dinate to facts about form or soul, and not “as explanatorily primitive” as
them.
Conclusion
I began by noting a recent trend to interpret Aristotle’s biological explana-
tions as treating facts about matter as explanatorily primitive. This inter-
pretation, however, is in tension with what we would have expected, given
what Aristotle says outside the biological works. And, I argued, it is far
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from obvious that the biological explanations treat facts about matter as
primitive. I offered the following three considerations.
First, from Aristotle’s discussions in PA ii.1, it would seem that matter at
the lowest level of composition – an organism’s bodily blend or krasis – is
not primitive, at least not if one accepts that citing what something is for
the sake of entails that it is explained. Second, there is reason to think that
certain appeals to krasis are not intended as references to primitive facts.
For Aristotle correlates facts about a kind’s krasis with facts about human
rationality. If human rational capacities are part of human essence, this
would render the coordination between essence and matter a coincidence.
But I do not think that this can be Aristotle’s view. Third and finally,
I have tried to indicate the way in which Aristotle’s conception of the
metabolic processes – the heating and cooling involved in reproduction,
development, and maintenance – imbeds the actions of the elemental
powers into the activity of the soul or form of the organism. Heat and
cold are tools by which soul activities are carried out. This bars them from
being “independently” operative in the way that has been suggested in the
recent literature.
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